Impartially, today Egypt is a copy (less bloody) of Syria: the national State and army in confrontation with terrorism and chaos.

Nahed Hattar

 

Impartially, today Egypt is a copy (less bloody) of Syria: the national State and army in confrontation with terrorism and chaos. But, with evidence, there are many differences between both cases which should be read carefully such as, first: the Egyptian political conflict has no sectarian causes and the Muslim Brotherhood failed to do so, despite attacks on churches. Second, there isn't any bordering country that sponsors the internal terrorism; as Gaza which provides a safe haven for the Muslim Brotherhood is small and has limited potentials, and Libya which is the terrorists' source of weapons is not a state anymore. Third, the Egyptian elites have stood beside the government, isolating the Muslim Brotherhood and their allies, politically. Forth, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which is, today, the spearhead in the war on Syria, is leading an effective Arab support for the Egyptian State.

The first and second givens are objective. The third given provokes admiration for the educated Egyptians' nationalism, sorrow towards the disintegration of their Syrian counterparts, and the degradation of some of them to the extent that they support or even join terrorists and invaders. If treachery can't be justified, then the setback of the Syrian elites, as a whole, to do their national duties was mainly due to suppression and marginalization that lasted for many years. This weakened them, caused psychological problems for some of them, and urged some of them to take ambiguous stances toward the national State. Knowing that it is the only framework in which a democratic and developmental project could be built.

We recognize here that the Egyptian State had won its bet on the advantage of the cultured Egyptians' characteristics including strugglers, intellectuals, writers, artists and journalists, etc., from the freedom and positions they have had in Egypt for a long time since the eighties. These elites have turned into a very powerful group in the face of the (Muslim) Brotherhood project, and in giving legitimacy for the Egyptian uprising against the political Islam forces and their project against the State, culture, development and freedoms.

The new Egyptian regime, whether it likes it or not, has to ally with the democratic, leftist and Nasserite elites, on an unprecedented scale. This is an alignment which doesn’t have room for cultured individuals in the State institutions, but rather reflects the socio-political balance of power and the size of the coming battle with the Islamists.

Thus, the Egyptian ruling groups would find themselves obliged to grant concessions in different fields, such as the freedom and secularization fields, as well as the socio-economic fields, for the benefit of the public groups.
Here we have to take notice that this field is controlled by the vigor of the public movements which is still attracting wide sectors of the audience. It would be extremely unfortunate that Syria moves toward the contrary; as in the control of the neo-liberal groups and the fade of the public movement that promotes, in any country, without any social ambitions.

Amid all of that, comes the Saudi support for the new regime in Egypt, in order to destroy this situation, including the danger of establishing dictatorships, promoting positions for anti-development aristocracy groups and regaining the policies of “Islamizing” society through the pro-Riyadh Salafist movements.

Saudi Arabia aims at setting the rhythm of the internal transformations, though its friendly attack in Egypt. But its main goals are absolutely geopolitical ones, such as: (1) to maintain the Egyptian peace policy with Israel, (2) to hit its Qatari and Turkish competitors and their Brotherhood tool under a Sunni leadership, (3) to restore Egypt, with its real weight, and transform it into an active ally in the face of Iran, (4) to promote the role of the Saudi negotiator in the coming settlement, on the regional level.

The apparent double standards policy is the least concern for Riyadh which denounces terrorism in Egypt and supports it in Syria; as the Saudi standard is actually one. It is the real stance toward Israel and Iran. For the Saudis, the Egyptian stability is necessary if Cairo maintained peace with Israel and could be driven to antagonize Iran or -at least- avoid agreements between the largest two Sunni and Shiite countries, which means the failure of the entire Saudi-Gulf project. On the other hand, overthrowing the Syrian regime is a Saudi must, as long as it stays adherent to its enmity to Israel and its relations with the resistance, Tehran and Hezbollah.

In Egypt, which is overflowing with a dynamic public movement, the internal and external policies can’t be decided today by understandings with Cairo’s strong-man today, Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi, but in the framework of internal interactions which could lead to changes - not dramatic but basic - in the foreign policy; as the Egyptian-American relations are expected to decline or, at least, stagnate for the sake of the growth of the power of the national movement will lead to a freeze in relations with Israel, rather than enhance them. In contrast, it will not allow forming an anti-Iran atmosphere, unless the latter got involved in flattering the Egyptian Brotherhood or was embraced, once again, by Hamas Movement, in the context of supporting an “Islamic awakening” which was proven to be sectarian to death.

 

The article was originally published in Arabic in Al-Akhbar newspaper