Naming of Gadi Eisenkot as the Israeli military chief succeeding Beni Gantz came under abnormal situation. The latter was fatal enemy and realized during 2006 war..
Yahya Dbouk - Al-Akhbar
Naming of Gadi Eisenkot as the Israeli military chief succeeding Beni Gantz came under abnormal situation. The latter was fatal enemy and realized during 2006 war (as commander of ground forces) the limits of Israel's might as well as Hezbollah reactions, the prices and the red lines. All those led him to maintain the status-quo in Lebanon without wide combat rounds all over the last years. However, does this mean that Eisenkot - who put forth the "Dahiya Doctrine" and killing of Lebanese civilians - will implement his combat theories and accelerate the war towards Lebanon.
The decision and intellectual medium of Eisenkot and Gantz are indifferent. The former was deputy chief of staff and participated in his decisions - whether they were offensive or defensive. He belongs to the school of former chief of staff Gabi Ashkenazi, which not only proved to be more rational than others in the military institution for believing in force only when no other option is on table, but also became more influential in the political and military awareness of Israelis, as a result of the war and the prices paid in 2006 war.
From this background, Eisenkot will continue the task, typically just like Gantz, i.e. staying apart from Iran for lacking any possible military option despite the assessment that he will continue waging it. Moreover, he will not move to wide confrontations against the Palestinians following the failure to coerce them to surrender during "Shelf Steadfast" operation more than four months ago.
Nevertheless, the northern front - on the Lebanese and Syrian sides - will remain more complicated than the capacity of any general who would be committed to the military command in Israel, knowing that the final word in any assumed confrontation will be the cost-benefit accounts that will dominate the intellect of the chief of staff-to-be.
The Hebrew media may be preoccupied by Eisenkot's offensive theories against Hezbollah and Lebanon in 2008, yet there is great difference between yesterday, today and tomorrow.
Eisenkot wanted to enforce the Israeli deterrence against Hezbollah through "Dahiya Doctrine", especially that he belongs to the command staff that doesn't want to repeat the failure of 2006, when he was head of operations division and confessed to the Israeli failure in two domains: the inability to settle the war along 33 days, and the continuing of bombing the Israeli depth till the last day of the war.
Only two years after the "Dahiya Doctrine", the author who advocated it long as the perfect solution to the dilemma of Hezbollah, ignored it and moved to a recognition of new formula in front of Hezbollah: the cold war.
In a meeting with head of local authorities in Israel (May 24, 2010), Eisenkot noted that "Hezbollah methods remind by the cold war in Europe," adding that "mutual deterrence results in huge tension". Speaking on "cold war" and confession to "mutual deterrence" express the changes of power balance between Israeli army and Hezbollah between 2008 and 2010, thus what the changes of year 2014 would affect?
Perhaps "Dahiya Doctrine" was possible in the Gaza Strip, where Israel has the capability to destruct, kill civilians and cross all the war laws and norms, while the Palestinian factions have nothing to deter Israel from killing and destruction, without expecting to witness killing and destruction on the other front. However, as for Lebanon, this theory had been buried several years ago, and became senseless except within the framework of the psychological war.
In addition to that, Eisenkot equation has something that eases the Lebanese in his old threat. When he threatens by mass destruction, he starts from the destruction and horrors which he predicts occurred in Israel if the war erupts. which forced him to threaten in order to deactivate the other threat: Mutual deterrence between parties postpones the war at the very least.
On such bases and controls, i.e. the mutual deterrence, a change in the equation between Lebanon and Israel is not expected, just like it has been planned recently and confirmed at the time of his predecessor Beni Gantz. A war and preemptive wide confrontation - not desired by its two parties - are not expected also. But at the same time, the error in calculations will rule the possibility or impossibility of a war, which means that the effort of Eisenkit will focus on not making any fatal error that might cause a war which Israel doesn't like, and probably cannot bear its consequences.
